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Abstract 
One thing can be said to be common to all forms of debit card fraud – authentication 
bypass. This implies that a secure debit card transaction system can only be 
guaranteed by a safe and reliable authentication system. Many approaches have 
been adopted to ensure a secure authentication system, but often, these 
approaches are either focused on the Automated Teller Machines (ATM)/Point of 
Sales (POS) terminals or Online/e-commerce transactions, thus not providing full 
security on both fronts. In this work, we address this problem by adopting a multi-
factor debit card system that uses a combination of the traditional Personal 
Identification Number code (PIN) and the mobile-phone delivered One-Time 
Password (OTP) with a biometric authentication option (fingerprint). We 
demonstrate that this approach ensures the security of both online and terminal 
transactions. The fingerprint option makes it easy to use by people who find 
memorizing PINs difficult. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of electronic payment methods is not only widely accepted in developed societies but 
has become the norm. The increasing number of people with bank accounts has been 
accompanied by an increase in the use of debit cards – now being widely used by current and 
savings account holders at the point-of-sale and at Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) 
worldwide. The growth in retail banking accounts, together with widespread consolidation in 
the industry and the merging of smaller banks into larger entities, have been highly beneficial 
trends for both banks and their customers. But just like every other forms of payment, cards 
are exposed to security vulnerabilities. While traditional forms of card payment frauds (stolen 
card fraud, card-not-present transaction, etc.) are still an important threat, fraud due to 
unauthorized access to customer’s payment data appears to be on the rise (Sullivan 2010). If 
someone, say B, steals A’s card or gains access to A’s card number, then B can potentially 
deplete funds from A’s account. And, at the end of several unauthorized transactions, this can 
result in overdraft fees, bounced checks or even bankruptcy for A, in cases whereby the bank 
is not liable for any fraudulent transactions made from one’s debit card. 
The security of a debit card system depends greatly on a secure and reliable authentication 
system. Many approaches have been adopted to ensure a secure authentication system in the 
state-of-the-art. However, most of these approaches are focused either on the ATM/POS 
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terminals or Online/e-commerce transactions only. Furthermore, they do not consider 
customers with a low level of education who finds it hard to remember complex PINs. There 
is, therefore, a need for a robust and user-friendly system that guarantees debit cards 
transaction security both at terminals (ATM and POS) and in online transaction environment. 
This work fills this gap by providing a new system that features the following characteristics: 
 Is highly secure for both terminal and online transactions; 
 Provides tighter security measures than the existing system; 
 Is User-friendly especially for people who find it difficult to remember complex PINs. 
The work tackles the authentication problems of the debit card system as a whole. It proposes 
two authentication pathways which are the biometric authentication with fingerprint and the 
PIN with One Time Password (OTP). While the fingerprint authentication is more suitable in 
terminal transactions, the PIN with OTP is advisable for online transactions although the two 
can be used on any transaction platform. 
2. Background 
The single factor authentication (e.g. passwords or PIN) is no longer considered secure in the 
debit card world today because of the many attacks on systems with this authentication 
method (Aloul, Zahidi, and El-Hajj 2009). In order to circumvent this hurdle, two-factor 
authentication methods have recently been introduced to meet the demand of organizations 
for providing stronger authentication options (Aloul, Zahidi, and El-Hajj 2009; Parameswari 
and José 2011; Saha and Sanyal 2014). In most cases, a hardware token is given to each user 
for each account. But the increasing number of carried tokens and the cost of manufacturing 
and maintenance those has become a burden on both the client and organization. An 
alternative is to install software tokens on the clients’ mobile phones, since most clients, if not 
all, carry mobile phones today at all times (Gupta 2013) and to use a biometric technique for 
verification along with existing PIN. However, in rural areas, people find it sometimes 
challenging to remember complicated PINs (Bachas et al. 2017). For this specific class of 
people, the use of only biometric verification can help them access any ATM in an easier 
manner and hence increase its popularity among rural masses as well increase security. Our 
approach, which combines the two features mentioned above (two-way authentication and 
biometric authentication), ensures a debit card system that is secure, inclusive, reliable and 
user-friendly even for those who find it difficult to understand complicated PINs. 
2.1. Review of debit card attacks 
The concept of attacking debit cards is a situation in which someone, say B, is attempting an 
unauthorized use of someone else’s, say A, debit card in order to obtain goods of value on the 
internet, ATM or POS terminal. Such attacks include counterfeiting cards, using lost or stolen 
cards and fraudulently acquiring debit card numbers through the mail. Here, the fraudster 
uses a physical card, but physical possession is not essential. A typical case is the “cardholder-
not-present” fraud, where only the card details are given (e.g. over the phone) (Gossett and 
Hyland 1999). There are various ways by which fraudsters attack Debit cards. But most, if not 
all, can be grouped under one of the three following groups: (1) phishing, (2) skimming or (3) 
identity theft. 
2.1.1. Phishing 
Phishing attacks are one of the fastest growing fraud trends for both large and small financial 
institutions (Andronova et al. 2018). Apart from sounding like 'fishing', both concepts share 
the same mode of operation. Specifically, whereby a fisher trolls in a boat on the river and 
uses bait to catch the fish, criminals who perpetuate phishing also troll the Internet by using 
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any communication method (email or websites for example). In phishing emails, for example, 
phishers use bait to convince the user and steal his credentials such as card number, Social 
Security (SS) number, and/or passwords (Andronova et al. 2018). Phishing e-mails appear to 
come from a known individual or an organization - with which the victim may or may not have 
an account- and ask for victims’ personal information. This results in identity theft, fraud, and 
possible account hijacking. On phishing websites, victims are tricked into clicking on some 
links, which redirects to malicious websites that request the victim’s sensitive information. If 
the victim is not well educated about this type of attack, he can divulge this information, which 
may then be used to gain unauthorized access to the victim’s debit card. 
2.1.2. Skimming 
Card skimming is an alternative way for fraudsters to steal cardholder’s identity and use it to 
commit fraud, i.e. to borrow money and/or take out loans in victim’s name (Rizou 2010). It 
usually occurs at payment terminals – ATM and POS terminals. The perpetrator makes use of 
special devices, called skimmers. These are hidden devices attached to legitimate payment 
terminals by fraudsters to illicitly capture account information (Scaife, Peeters, and Traynor 
2018). Some skimmers can store large volumes of track information while some others do not 
store data but transmit it to a scammer. Once criminals have skimmed the card, they are able 
to create a fake or ‘cloned’ card with the victim details. Then, they run up charges on the 
victim account. 
2.1.3. Identity theft 
Identity theft consists of using information (e.g. name, address, SS number) related to the 
identity of one person to gain unauthorized access to something (Manap, Abdul Rahim, and 
Taji 2015). These types of records make it easier for criminals to get control over accounts in 
the victim’s name and assume his identity. Here, perpetrators observe directly a victim from 
a nearby location, such as looking over someone’s shoulder to extract valuable information. It 
is especially effective in crowded places and/or when the victim keys in his PIN at an ATM or 
a POS terminal, public internet facilities, public and university libraries or airport kiosks. 
Shoulder surfing can also be accomplished at a distance using binoculars or other vision-
enhancing devices. Inexpensive, miniature closed-circuit television cameras are yet other 
options. They can be concealed in ceilings, walls or fixtures to observe data entry. Criminals 
can also go through the victims’ garbage cans or a communal dumpster or trash bin to obtain 
sensitive information. 
3. Multi-Factor Authentication and Fingerprint-based Debit Card System 
Multi-factor authentication allows more than one means of authentication in a single system 
(Saha and Sanyal 2014). This drastically reduces the risk of a system being compromised 
because the chance of more than one authentication factors being broken or lost at the same 
time is very limited. Also, the application of multifactor authentication increases the number 
of mediums in which a Debit card system can be deployed. Note that the withdrawal of money 
from an ATM machine utilizes a two-factor authentication; the user must (1) possess the ATM 
card, i.e. what he has, and must (2) know a unique PIN, i.e. what he knows. Despite this 
additional level of security, two-factor authentication of terminal transactions can be easily 
bypassed. So, adding a third factor like a One-Time-Password (OTP) delivered to customer’s 
mobile phone will make the system much more secure and more difficult, if not impossible, 
to bypass (Parameswari and José 2011). An OTP behaves exactly as its name indicates: It is 
used exactly once; after which it is no longer valid. This provides a very strong defense against 
eavesdroppers, compromised telnet commands, and even publication of login sessions. 
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3.1. Authentication with fingerprint 
Obiano (2009) blamed the menace of ATM frauds on indiscriminate issuance of ATM cards by 
financial institutions without giving due consideration to the customer’s literacy level. 
According to this author, one of the frequent causes of fraud is when customers are careless 
with their cards and PIN numbers as well as their response to unsolicited email and text 
messages to provide their card details. Using a biometric information like the fingerprint in 
place of a PIN, which can be accessed by various dubious means discussed above, is more 
secure (Oko and Oruh 2012). On the other hand, fingerprint technologies have also advanced 
so much that synthetic fingerprints can be detected from real ones. In addition, people who 
find memorizing the PIN difficult will no longer stand such risks as being careless with their 
(written down) PIN or telling unscrupulous individuals their PIN to transact on their behalf. 
This will drastically reduce the rate at which the less educated people suffer from fraudsters 
due to their inability to deal with numerical complexities such as PIN. 
3.2. The multi factor approach 
In the system proposed in this work, the user can choose between using the fingerprint 
authentication or the PIN system associated to a randomly generated 3-digit number, which 
will be sent to his mobile phone (the phone number is the one registered with the debit card). 
We propose that this choice be available for both online and terminal transactions. For PIN 
based transaction, the system will prompt the user to key in a 3-digit OTP generated for the 
transaction that is being processed. The transaction can only be completed upon successful 
entry of a valid OTP – together with a valid PIN. The 3-digit validation is meant to timeout after 
a short period to prevent a deadlock situation in case there is a problem with the SMS 
gateway. Algorithm 1 (see following page) describes the pseudocode of the operations. 
4. Implementation 
To demonstrate the performance of the proposed approach, an ATM machine simulation was 
developed using the Java programming Language, Microsoft Access database, VeriFinger free 
fingerprint Software Development Kit (SDK) (Neurotechnology 2010) and Nesmo SMS gateway 
(Nexmo 2017) to deliver the OTP. Figure 1 shows the start page of the system interface 
provides the two proposed authentication methods. 
 
Figure 1: The landing page of the debit card terminal 
If the user chooses the fingerprint option, he gets a prompt to thumbprint the fingerprint 
scanner after which he will be authenticated or rejected if his fingerprint does not match. 
Upon successful authentication, the user is directed to the landing page where he can perform 
transactions. If the user opts for fingerprint authentication, he will not need an OTP to 
complete transactions. 
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Algorithm 1: Multi-Factor Authentication with Fingerprint and OTP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Begin 
Read card details     #user inserts card/card details 
Read authentication option    #user selects authentication option 
if (authentication_option == fingerprint) 
 Scan fingerprint    #Scans user fingerprint 
 if (fingerprint match) 
  Proceed to transaction 
 else 
  Reject card and deny transaction 
  end if 
else if (authentication_option == PIN with OTP) 
 attempts = 0 
while (attempts < 3) 
Read PIN   #user keys in his/her PIN 
  Read transaction details 
  Send OTP to users’ phone 
  Read OTP    #user keys in the OTP sent to his/her mobile phone 
  if (OTP is correct and PIN is correct) 
   Proceed to transaction 
  else 
   Reject card and deny transaction 
   End if  
Attempt+=1 
  if (attempt ==3) 
   Block card 
  end while 
end if 
end 
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Figure 2 shows a fingerprint mismatch error reported by the system. 
 
Figure 2: Fingerprint mismatch - authentication denied 
On the other hand, if the user chooses the “PIN with OTP” option, a prompt will appear for 
the user to login with his PIN (simulating the usual process of inserting the cards and entering 
the 4-digit PIN or entering the card number in online transaction). The system has a maximum 
number of permitted login attempts before the debit card is flagged for fraud protection and 
the card is disabled for some days. Figure 3 shows a prompt where the system informs the 
user about the remaining login attempts before the card is disabled. 
 
Figure 3: PIN login error, the card will be blocked after 2 more unsuccessful 
attempts 
Upon successful authentication, the user is directed to the transaction page where he can 
perform transactions. The home page of the debit card system, modelled after an ATM 
machine interface, is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: transaction page 
The user will need an OTP to complete transactions under this authentication option. After 
entering the transaction details, a 3-digit OTP will be sent to the user’s mobile phone and he 
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will be prompted to enter these digits. Once a valid OTP is entered, the user can perform the 
transaction. Figure 5 shows an interface prompting the user to key-in the OTP while a display 
showing the confirmation message from the system is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 5: Prompt for OTP to continue transaction 
 
Figure 6: OTP confirmation 
The two-factor authentication methods give users secure authentication choices within the 
debit card system. These authentication methods are suitable for both terminal and online 
debit card transactions. 
5. Literature Review 
Authentication is as old as the crime of impersonation and identity theft. Since these crimes 
have been detected, man has been using different means to assert that a person’s claim to a 
thing is genuine. The oldest and the most basic of these methods is verbally asking the parties 
involved for verbal clarification. This seems to be the most reliable but at the same time the 
most inefficient method by far. There are other common means developed over time which 
includes signatures, seals and the evolving electronic authentication. Our focus is, however, 
on debit card authentication methods, and, below, we present a review of previous works on 
debit card authentication. 
5.1. Two-factor authentication 
Aloul, Zahidi, and El-Hajj (2009) addressed the problem of carrying out secure authentication 
via mobile devices. They proposed the use of a two-factor method of authentication, which 
makes use of something you have (mobile phone) and something you know (one-time 
password). The method involves the use of a mobile phone for the generation of a one-time 
password (OTP), or the use of SMS in retrieving a remotely generated OTP from a server. 
Results showed this two-factor authentication method to be a more secure form of verifying 
users than traditional password systems. They also showed how this method can be used to 
eliminate the problems that one actor authentication methods (e.g. passwords) face. Their 
method provides a cheaper alternative to current two-factor authenticating systems (tokens, 
cards) widely used today. It does this by making use of the users’ mobile phone for OTP 
generation, therefore eliminating the extra cost involved in purchasing additional tokens and 
cards. The work, however, still requires users to memorize PINs and the solution is not robust 
enough to accommodate people who find it difficult to recall their PINS. 
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5.2. Single-sign-on systems 
When a user has several accounts with different service providers, he needs to remember and 
use different user-ids and passwords while connecting to those accounts. The single sign-on 
(SSO) mechanism relieves users from having to undergo unnecessary multiple authentications 
for each service. Ying, Yao, and Hua (2009) pointed out that systems that have a single sign-
on experience, assign the same level of security to each service providers within a distributed 
network. But, according to the authors, this is not secure. Typically, if one of the services 
provided within the distributed network becomes compromised, then the single sign-on 
experience will tend to pose a threat to other service providers that require a higher level of 
security. The authors proposed a multi-level authentication mechanism (MLASSO), in which 
different security levels that are required by different service providers can be automatically 
analysed and assigned by a server. This improves the flexibility, performance and security of 
the network. 
5.3. Strong authentication 
Van Thanh et al. (2009) introduced the concept of using the mobile phone device as a token 
for authentication instead of a traditional hardware token. The overall cost of using an 
additional device to carry out authentication is very high for organizations that must maintain 
thousands of tokens. Also, users will have to carry around hardware tokens whenever they 
need to carry out authentication on the fly. The authors proposed the use of mobile phones 
as a replacement for hardware tokens. 
5.4. Social authentication 
Soleymani and Maheswaran (2009) suggested that social authentication factor (someone you 
know), should be highly dependent on the social network the individual belongs to. That is, 
every individual who uses a mobile device as an authenticator needs to belong to a social 
network. In the case when a member of that network has lost his secret credentials or the 
mobile device, that person will require someone to vouch for him. During the process of 
vouching for someone, the secret credential is not sent to the voucher but to the individual 
who needs to be vouched for. This maintains the secrecy and privacy of the credentials and 
thus, adds an additional level of security to the already existing system. A downside to this is 
that the compromise of anyone on the network puts every other person on the social network 
at risk. 
5.5. Biometric authentication 
Person’s identification is crucially significant in many applications and the hike in debit card 
fraud and identity theft in recent years indicates that this is an issue of major concern in wider 
society. Because passwords are known to be one of the easiest targets of hackers, biometrics-
based authentication offers several advantages over other authentication techniques. It is a 
rapidly advancing field that is concerned with identifying a person based on his physiological 
or behavioural characteristics (Oko and Oruh 2012). Biometric authentication has grown in 
popularity to provide personal identification. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper provides a robust solution to debit card authentication problems by adopting a 
multi-factor approach with two authentication pathways. The two pathways are biometric 
authentication with fingerprint and PIN combined with OTP. With its flexibility of offering 
different authentication options, users can now enjoy a variety of not only secure but also 
easy authentication process. In this context, the fingerprint authentication comes as a big 
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relief to people who find it hard to deal with complicated PIN. Living in a world with growing 
e-commerce and online transaction activities, we strongly believe that this approach would 
be very helpful in many domains. 
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